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Introduction
The State of E.C. Competition Law:

Fifteen Years Ago and Today

Frank Fine
In 1989, I was asked by the Northwestern Journal of International
Law & Business to participate in a published symposium on EC competition
law. My topic was the draft EC Merger Regulation, which was adopted by
the Council of Ministers later that year. Fifteen years later, the Journalhas
requested me to chair this symposium and to write the introduction for it.
All of the practitioners and scholars participating in this current symposium
are aware of the seismic changes that have jarred the EC competition law
landscape during this time. I am privileged to offer a few personal thoughts
and reflections on where we have been and where, perhaps, we are heading.
First of all, on the subject of merger control, the Commission has been
unfairly targeted by various journalists, particularly from the United States,
for what has been perceived as discrimination against U.S. multinationals
seeking to merge or acquire each other. The GE/Honeywell merger is often
singled out as evidence of this "trend." This is not an apology of any kind
for the Commission, but the facts are that of the numerically increasing
number of deals that are prohibited by the Commission (as opposed to
proportionally increasing, which is not the case), only a fraction of them
involve U.S.-to-U.S. companies, and this is assuming that the U.S. domicile
of a multinational, such as General Electric, is of any consequence at all on
this account. The fact is, in order for deals to be prohibited by the
Commission, the firms concerned must have a significant market share in
the European Union. This usually means that the companies concerned
have large numbers of employees on their European payrolls. Under these
circumstances, a merger prohibition which fell into the anti-American
paradigm (which still suffers from simplistic ambiguity) means that the
Commission in effect would be shooting the E.U. economy in the
proverbial foot.
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In my view, the Merger Regulation is the Commission's greatest
triumph of the last fifteen years in the field of competition policy, and
arguably since EC enforcement began in the early 1960's. Without the
Regulation (which coincidentally has been revised today for the second
time since 1989), EC competition lawyers and their clients would still be in
the dark ages. Memories tend to fade on what used to be-a world of
parallel investigations carried out by Member States, or sometimes by a
Member State and by the Commission, the latter acting on arcane,
unworkable, re-interpretations of Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty which
was never intended by the "Founding Fathers." This troubling environment
came to an end with the "one stop shop" provided by the EC Merger
Regulation. Most multinational companies are thankful for the Regulation.
Their attention has turned to global convergence, and how the Regulation
can be made to be more compatible with other proliferated merger control
systems. That is not a criticism of the Regulation, but rather, a compliment
to the Council and Commission for having adopted a regulatory scheme that
works well in practice, while overcoming sovereignty issues at a national
level.
The "shop" in which companies will only need to stop once to obtain
EC merger clearances is about to become much larger. In May 2004, the
European Union will expand to include the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary,
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus. This will be
welcome news to all companies engaged in large-scale mergers, as they will
be able to file one notification in Brussels and thereby, provided that the
Regulation's thresholds for "[c]ommunity dimension" are met, avoid
national competition filings in the twenty-five Member States.
Of course, there is much more that the Commission has accomplished
in the field of competition law over the last fifteen years. Its complete
reformation of vertical policy, as well as the upcoming block exemption
and comprehensive guidelines on technology licensing, should not be
overlooked as significant examples of how the Commission has sought to
respond to the evolving commercial and antitrust climate.
It is here, perhaps, that plaudits for the Commission should be
balanced with more critical concerns.
It is indisputable that the
Commission is achieving ever greater rationalization and efficiencies in the
field of merger control, thereby maximizing commercial benefits while
minimizing regulatory hurdles. The Commission appears to be on a
completely different track when it comes to non-merger arrangements, such
as strategic alliances, distribution agreements, technology licenses, joint
selling agreements and joint purchasing agreements.
While the
Commission is seeking to maximize legal certainty for companies planning
concentrations, in the other spheres of business activity which fall within
the ambit of Articles 81 and 82, including those noted above, the
Commission has decided that the legal certainty afforded by the old
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notification/exemption system should be abandoned in favor of a "selfassessment" system. In short, the Commission's time-honored notification
regime will vanish starting in May 2004.
The self-assessment system is actually part of a larger reform of
Commission enforcement policy known as the "modernization" program,
which is intended to result in a large devolution of enforcement of Articles
81 and 82 to the Member State competition authorities and courts. The
Commission wishes to dispense with the examination of notified
agreements, most of which are not competition sensitive, so that it may
focus its resources on large-scale cartels and abuses of dominant position.
The objective is laudable, but the real issue will be whether the
Commission's new approach to competition enforcement will result in the
time savings that the Commission is counting on. It is conceivable that
rather than resulting in efficiencies, the decentralization of enforcement will
create new, unforeseeable burdens for the Commission. Rather than poring
over innocuous notifications, Commission officials will be responsible for
coordinating the investigations of Member State regulators to avoid
needless multiplicity (although forum shopping will become a given) and
providing guidance to national regulators and courts in complex cases.
Moreover, despite the abolition of notifications as such, the Commission
will come under great pressure to provide companies with some form of
"comfort" because they are unable to find sufficient guidance in the case
law or in Commission guidelines and block exemptions to deal with
complex factual situations. However, it is clear that the Commission's
willingness to provide legal guidance will be limited and non-binding.
The Commission's modernization package includes a ramping up of
Commission powers and penalties, in addition to information sharing with
Member State authorities. The Commission will be empowered to raid
private residences, to "interview" (effectively take recorded depositions
from) prospective witnesses in Commission offices and, in the case of dawn
raids, to fine target companies up to one percent of their past fiscal year's
group revenue for each individual failure of a company employee to
correctly answer a question put by a Commission investigator. These
developments come at a time in which criminal antitrust liability for
company employees now exists in the United Kingdom, as the result of the
Enterprise Act 2002, and when other Member States are likely to follow
suit in order to demonstrate their competition credentials. Companies will
need to review their European antitrust compliance programs and better
educate their employees as to the potential consequences of illicit activity.
The specter of jail time will be a powerful inducement for executives to
snitch on their employers.
It is also noteworthy that the increased powers of the Commission
were not accompanied by safeguards and warnings for the individual.
Lurking in the shadows are human rights issues, which the Commission,
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whether deliberately or by oversight, has left to the European Court and the
European Court of Human Rights to sort out.
These reforms will come into force on the very day that the European
Union absorbs ten new Member States. The Commission would have been
under great pressure, even without the Accession, to get the new machinery
up and running in a fair and efficient manner. By all accounts, the
Accession will only complicate an ambitious enforcement scheme whose
functions and effects on business have yet to be fully fathomed.
The post-modernization climate will have long-lasting effects on the
way in which competition law is practiced in the European Union. The
most significant trade-off for "self-assessment" will be increased reliance
by companies on their outside competition advisors. In other words, being
unable to obtain formal Commission exemptions, companies will want
greater assurances from their competition lawyers. In terms of labor and
expense, this might amount to the functional equivalent of completing a
notification on Form A/B, minus some of the more mundane information
elicited by the Commission. However, the variables posed by decentralized
enforcement will greatly complicate the task of the competition advisor.
Either to seek the advantages of a favorable forum or, in defense of his
client, to determine whether the forum should be changed, the advisor will
need to obtain a grasp of national enforcement procedures. Multiple
complaints and parallel investigations will become much more common
simply because the new Commission regime has facilitated this
development. Human rights defenses and other procedural challenges will
suddenly figure prominently in the representation of the client. All this
seems to presage that legal costs will be on the rise, rather than the
converse, at least with regard to contentious activity.
We may reasonably predict that the Merger Regulation will be lauded
for years to come. The Commission has accepted a much more daunting
challenge by having implemented its modernization program. We can only
hope that it achieves similar success, which will only be evident after three
to five years.
The Journal should be commended for having organized this timely
symposium. There was no better time, in fact.

